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2.1 Introduction
In Switzerland and the Netherlands residents are obliged to obtain basic health insurance. In 
both countries a risk equalization1 system has been implemented to realize cross subsidies 
from low-risk to high-risk individuals. In addition, insurers must accept every eligible 
applicant for a community-rated premium. Another common aspect is that the insured may 
opt for a deductible, which means that they can choose to pay expenditures up to a certain 
amount out-of-pocket in return for a premium rebate. The presence of  a deductible option 
raises two important questions regarding the respective risk equalization systems. 
The first question is: ‘What are the effects of  equalizing different types of  expenditures?’. 
In a situation where all insured have the same coverage, differences in risk and health can 
be adjusted for by simply equalizing the net insurance claims.2 This implies that the insurer’s 
equalization payment for insured i equals the average net claims in i’s risk group minus the 
overall average net claims.3 If  the payment is positive, the insurer receives it; if  it is negative, 
the insurer must pay it into the risk equalization fund. In a situation where some insured 
choose a deductible and others do not, variation in net claims is not only attributable to 
differences in health and risk, but also to differences in out-of-pocket expenditures and 
moral hazard (reduction). If  just the net claims are equalized, as is currently (2006) the 
case in Switzerland, then out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reductions are totally 
neglected. An option would be to equalize the latter two components as well. The first purpose 
of  this paper is to clarify the implications of  equalizing different types of  expenditures.
The second question is ‘What are the consequences of  self  selection?’. Self  selection occurs 
because healthy insured have a greater incentive to opt for a deductible than unhealthy insured. 
As a result, expenditure differences between these groups are (partly) due to differences 
in health and risk. In the absence of  risk equalization, competing insurers are forced to 
incorporate these expenditure differences into the premium rebate. In the presence of  risk 
equalization, the effect of  self  selection on the premium rebate will be smaller since these 
differences are adjusted for via the equalization payments. However, it is unlikely that the 
current (2006) Swiss and Dutch equalization systems do fully adjust for self  selection. Part of  
the differences in health status may still be incorporated into the premium structure, resulting 
in a reduction of  cross subsidization between the healthy and the unhealthy compared to a 
situation without a deductible option. The second purpose of  this paper is to indicate the 
extent to which the current Swiss and Dutch equalization systems adjust for the effect of  
self  selection.
1 I.e. risk adjustment.
2 The net insurance claims are defined as the expenditures that are actually reimbursed. Henceforth, 
these expenditures are referred to as ‘net claims’.
3 In the Netherlands the risk equalization payment equals the average annual insurance claims in i’s 
risk group minus a fixed amount that does not necessarily equal the overall average insurance claims. 
However, this detail is not relevant for the analyses and conclusions in this paper.
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Before these questions are discussed, section 2.2 provides a brief  description of  the Swiss 
and Dutch basic health insurance schemes and their risk equalization systems. Section 2.3 is 
concerned with the first question and theoretically considers the consequences of  equalizing 
different types of  expenditures. After that, the paper focuses on the second question and 
reports on an empirical study aimed at examining the extent to which the current Swiss and 
Dutch equalization systems adjust for self  selection. Finally, section 2.8 summarizes and 
discusses the conclusions.
2.2 Risk equalization in Switzerland and The Netherlands
The Dutch and Swiss basic health insurance schemes have many similarities. However, there 
are important differences with respect to funding, user charges and risk equalization. Hence, 
we briefly describe the relevant aspects of  both systems in 2006.
2.2.1 Switzerland
Since the Revised Health Insurance Law came into force in January 1996, all Swiss residents 
must obtain individual basic health insurance. There is open enrollment, which means that 
insurers are obliged to accept every eligible applicant. Among others, the ‘basic’ package 
includes inpatient and outpatient care, physician services, physiotherapy, laboratory analyses, 
health care at home, nursing home care, technical aids, medicaments from pharmacy and 
physicians, and alternative and complementary benefits. On average about 85 percent of  the 
total expenditures is financed by the insurance premium and 15 percent is financed by user 
charges. The insurance premium is community-rated per insurer, region and age group (0-18, 
19-25 and >25) and is paid to the insurer.
In return for a premium rebate, insured can opt for a deductible starting from a mandatory 
minimum. The federal government has put upper limits on the premium rebate in order to 
protect cross subsidies from healthy to unhealthy individuals. Children (under 18 years of  
age) are exempted from mandatory deductibles and their voluntary deductible options are all 
lower then the options for adults. In addition to these deductibles there is a coinsurance of  
10 percent up to a maximum of  CHF 600 per person per year for all medical expenditures on 
top of  the (total) deductible. During inpatient care those from single-occupant households 
must pay hotel-type expenses of  CHF 10 per day. During the years for which we have data 
(1998-2003) the mandatory deductible was CHF 230 and the voluntary deductibles on top 
of  that were CHF 170, 370, 970 and 1,270 per person per year. 
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Every region has its own risk equalization system, which equalizes the net insurance claims 
and takes into account (only) two characteristics, i.e. age and gender. The insurer’s risk 
equalization payment for insured i equals the average actual net claims in i’s age/gender-
group (in i’s region of  residence) minus the overall average actual net claims (in i’s region of  
residence) (Beck et al., 2003).
2.2.2 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands all residents are obliged to have basic health insurance since the Health 
Insurance Law came into force on 1 January 2006. Similar to the Swiss scheme, the Dutch 
basic insurance is based on the principle of  individual insurance and the insurers are obliged 
to accept every eligible applicant. In general terms, the ‘basic’ package includes hospital care, 
care provided by general practitioners and specialists, prescription drugs, maternity care, 
obstetrics, technical aids and dental care for children. On average, 50 percent of  the total 
expenditures is financed by income-related contributions. These contributions are paid into 
the Risk Equalization Fund (REF), out of  which the insurers receive equalization payments. 
About 45 percent of  total expenditures is financed through insurance premiums. These 
premiums are paid directly to the insurer and are community-rated per province4 for all 
insured with the same type of  insurance policy5 provided by the same insurance company. 
Government finances medical care for children up to the age of  18 (into the REF) since 
children are exempted from paying insurance premiums.
Individuals (older than 17) who have no insurance claim in a certain year get a no-claim 
refund of  € 255. If  the total insurance claim is between € 0 and € 255 then the no-claim 
refund equals € 255 minus the actual claims. This applies to all medical benefits in the basic 
package except for care provided by the general practitioner, obstetrics and maternity care. 
On top of  the no-claim refund the insured may choose a deductible of  € 0, € 100, € 200, € 
300, € 400 or € 500 per person per year. 
The risk equalization model for 2006 is based on expenditure information of  the year 2003. 
The following risk factors are included in the model: age interacted with gender, region, 
source of  income, pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs), and diagnostic-based cost groups 
(DCGs). For a detailed description of  the use and the construction of  PCGs and DCGs 
in the Netherlands we refer to Lamers (1999a) and Lamers (1998, 1999b), respectively. In 
general terms, the insurer’s equalization payment for insured i is calculated as the expected 
(average) medical expenditures in i’s risk group minus a fixed amount which is the same for 
all the insured. The payment can be either positive or negative. As insurers are not able to 
4 The Netherlands is divided into 12 provinces.
5 In the Netherlands insurers can offer preferred-provider policies, policies with full freedom of choice 
and policies that are a mixture of these two. 
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control all types of  expenditures to the same extent, there is also a system of  ex-post risk 
sharing between the insurers and the REF.6 We will not discuss this in further detail since risk 
sharing is irrelevant for this paper.
2.2.3 A simplified risk equalization model
To answer the two questions raised in Section 2.1 we consider a general risk equalization 
model in which the insurer’s equalization payment for individual i is calculated as the average 
expenditures to be equalized in i’s risk group minus the average expenditures to be equalized 
in the entire population of  insured. In principle, this mechanism is consistent with that in 
Switzerland and the Netherlands.
2.3 The effects of  equalizing different types of  expenditures
If  insured have the same level of  coverage, variation in net insurance claims can be totally 
attributed to differences in risk and health. In the presence of  voluntary deductibles, this 
variation is also attributable to differences in out-of-pocket expenditures and differences in 
moral hazard. Consequently, equalizing the net claims is expected to have different outcomes 
in situations with and without a deductible option. This section theoretically considers the 
effects of  equalizing different types of  expenditures.
2.3.1 A conceptual framework
Figure 2.1 shows a scenario with just two risk types regarding medical expenditures: low-risk 
individuals (group A) and high-risk individuals (group B). There is no consumer information 
surplus and for each insurer 50 percent of  the insured belongs to group A and 50 percent 
belongs to group B. All insured have full coverage for medical expenditures and both insurers 
and the insured know to which risk group an individual belongs. The average insurance 
claims equal € 1,000 in risk group A and € 2,000 in risk group B. In a competitive health 
insurance market without risk equalization insurers are forced to ask different premiums. If  
we assume the premium to equal the (expected) insurance claims then it will be € 1,000 for 
the insured in risk group A and € 2,000 for the insured in risk group B.
6 The Dutch risk equalization system distinguishes between three components of health care costs, 
which are treated differently: production-dependent hospital costs plus costs of specialist care, 
production-independent hospital costs, and costs of other care. These components have varying 
degrees of ex-ante risk equalization and ex-post risk sharing, since insurers are not able to influence 
these costs to the same extent. The Dutch government aims to increase the risk equalization part and 
to decrease the risk sharing part for all appropriate types of health care in the near future.
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At a certain moment, risk equalization is introduced in order to realize cross subsidies between 
the low risks and the high risks. Insurers receive a positive payment for each insured in risk 
group B and a negative payment for each insured in risk group A. Equalization payment 
R for an insured in risk group j is calculated as the average insurance claims in risk group 
j minus the overall average insurance claims. Accordingly, RB equals € 500 (= € 2,000 - € 
1,500) and RA equals € -500 (= € 1,000 - € 1,500). As a result, the average sums of  insurance 
claims and equalization payments are equal for both risk groups, thus removing incentives 
for premium differentiation.
€ 0
€ 500
€ 1.000
€ 1.500
€ 2.000
€ 2.500
A B 
Net insurance claims
RB
RA
Figure 2.1 Equalizing the net claims when insured have the same level of  coverage
At a later moment the option to take a voluntary deductible is introduced, together with the 
regulation that premiums must be the same for all insured with the same deductible.7 Notice 
that this regulation is found in Switzerland and the Netherlands (in 2006). We assume that 
all insured in risk group A take the deductible and all insured in risk group B do not. On 
average the insured with a deductible pay € 300 themselves and have expenditure savings due 
to a moral hazard reduction of  € 200. Consequently, their average net claims drop to € 500. 
As shown in figure 2.2, the overall average net claims drop from € 1,500 to € 1,250. If  risk 
equalization is (still) based on the net claims then RB increases to € 750 (= € 2,000 - € 1,250) 
and RA decreases to € -750 (= € 500 - € 1,250). 
When the insurer has learned about this, the premium will equal € 1,250 (€ 500 - € -750) for 
insured who choose a deductible, which is lower than in a situation without the deductible 
option (figure 2.1). However, the premium for insured who do not choose the deductible will 
also equal € 1,250 (€ 2,000 - € 750), implying a premium rebate of  € 0. This probably results 
in none of  the insured opting for a deductible and no moral hazard reduction in later years.
7 Thus, premiums can be differentiated only according to the level of deductible (i.e. yes/no 
deductible).
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Figure 2.2 Equalizing the net claims in a situation with a deductible option
To enable insurers to include out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reductions in 
the premium rebate, these two types of  expenditures must be equalized as well. To do so, 
information is needed about the expenditures that insured pay themselves. In addition, 
accurate information is needed to estimate the moral hazard reduction due to the deductible. 
In this example we assume this information to be available. Figure 2.3 shows that the average 
expenditures to be equalized equal € 1,500 if  the three types of  expenditures are included. 
Similar to a situation without ‘a deductible option’ (figure 2.1), RB equals € 500 (= € 2,000 - € 
1,500) and RA equals € -500 (= € 1,000 - € 1,500). When the insurer has learned about this, 
the premium for an insurance policy without a deductible will equal € 1,500 and the premium 
for a policy with a deductible will equal € 1,000, implying a premium rebate of  € 500. 
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Figure 2.3 Equalizing the net claims, out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reduction 
in a situation with a deductible option
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2.3.2 Three types of  expenditures
Thus, in the presence of  a deductible option three types of  expenditures can be equalized: 
the net insurance claims NET, the out-of-pocket expenditures OOPE and moral hazard 
reduction RMH. If  all three types are included then risk equalization payment R for 
individuals in risk group j equals:
 )()()1.2( RMHOOPENETRMHOOPENETR jjjj 
where the first term represents the averages in risk group j and the second term represents 
the overall averages. In fact, each type of  expenditure can be seen as a separate element in 
risk equalization, as demonstrated in equation (2.2). 
 )()()()2.2( RMHRMHOOPEOOPENETNETR jjjj 
Applying equation (2.2) to the situation of  figure 2.3 shows that the total equalization payment 
of  € -500 for individuals in risk group A is composed of   € -750  )( NETNET A  , € 150 
 )( OOPEOOPE A   and € 100  )( RMHRMH A  . The total equalization payment of  € 500 
for individuals in risk group B is composed of  € 750, € -150 and € -100, respectively.
2.3.3 Incentives for cream skimming
In the scenario of  section 2.3.1 the risk equalization model perfectly explains the variance in 
choice of  deductible, i.e. all insured in group A choose a deductible and all insured in group 
B do not. In practice this is unrealistic, except when the level of  deductible is included as 
a risk factor in the equalization system. We consider a second scenario to demonstrate the 
consequences of  equalizing different types of  expenditures in a situation where this is not 
the case. In this scenario, which is shown in figure 2.4, equalizing just the net claims has a 
second effect (next to the effect discussed in Section 2.3.1), which is that insurers will be 
confronted with incentives for cream skimming. 
If  50 percent of  the insured in group A and none of  the insured in group B choose a 
deductible and just the net claims are equalized then RA equals € -625 (€ 750 - € 1,375) 
and RB equals € 625 (€ 2,000 - € 1,375). The sum of  net claims and equalization payments 
equal € 1,625 (€ 1,000 - € -625) for insured in risk group A without a deductible, € 1,125 
(€ 500 - € -625) for insured in risk group A with a deductible, and € 1,375 (€ 2,000 - € 625) 
for insured in risk group B. Because of  the ban on premium differentiation the insurer 
is forced to ask a premium of  € 1,458 (1/3 * € 1,625 + 2/3 * € 1,375) 8 to the insured 
8 In the group of insured without a deductible 1/3 is of risk type A and 2/3 of is of risk type B.
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without a deductible and € 1,125 to the insured with a deductible. Consequently, the insured 
in risk group B are profitable for insurers since their premium exceeds the net claims plus 
equalization payment. The opposite holds for insured in risk group A without a deductible, 
which implies an incentive for cream skimming. These incentives will not occur when out-
of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reductions are equalized as well.
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Figure 2.4 Equalizing the net claims when the risk equalization model explains some of  the 
variance in choice of  deductible
Notice that the premium rebate equals € 333 (€ 1,458 - € 1,125). Thus, the degree to which 
out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reductions can be incorporated into the 
premium rebate decreases when the risk equalization model explains more of  the variance 
in choice of  deductible.
2.3.4 An exceptional situation
Theoretically, there is an exceptional situation in which the average out-of-pocket expenditures 
and reductions in moral hazard are the same in all risk groups distinguished in the risk 
equalization system. An example is shown in figure 2.5. In this scenario the proportion of  
insured choosing a deductible is the same for A and B and in both groups insured with a 
deductible pay on average € 300 themselves and have expenditure savings due to less moral 
hazard of  € 200. If  just the net claims are equalized then RA equals € -500 (€ 750 - € 1,250) and 
RB equals € 500 (€ 1,750 - € 1,250). Consequently, the net claims plus equalization payments 
equal € 1,500 for insured without a deductible (€ 1,000 - € -500 in group A and € 2,000 - € 
500 in group B) and € 1,000 for insured with a deductible (€ 500 - € -500 in group A and € 
1,500 - € 500 in group B). When the insurer has learned about this, the premium will equal 
€ 1,500 for insured without a deductible and € 1,000 for insured with a deductible, which 
means a rebate of  € 500 (€ 1,500 - € 1,000). In this scenario, equalizing the out-of-pocket 
expenditures and moral hazard reductions would have no effect on the total equalization 
payment Rj since  OOPEOOPE j   = 0 and  RMHRMH j   = 0 for both risk groups.
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Figure 2.5 Equalizing the net claims in an exceptional situation where the average out-
of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reduction are the same in all risk groups 
distinguished in the equalization system.
2.3.5 Conclusion
We conclude that in the presence of  voluntary deductibles three types of  expenditures can 
be equalized, which are the net insurance claims, out-of-pocket expenditures and expenditure 
savings due to less moral hazard. The consequences of  equalizing different types of  
expenditures are different for three scenarios. 
In the first scenario risk equalization explains 100 percent of  the variance in choice of  
deductible, which will be the case if  the level of  deductible is included as a risk factor in 
the equalization model. If  just the net insurance claims are equalized then out-of-pocket 
expenditures and moral hazard reductions due to a deductible cannot be included in the 
premium rebate. The opposite holds if  these two types of  expenditures are equalized as 
well.
In the second scenario risk equalization explains some of  the variance in choice of  deductible. 
This scenario is most likely to occur in practice as long as the level of  deductible is not 
included as a risk factor in the equalization model. If  just the net insurance claims are 
equalized then the insurers will be confronted with incentives for cream skimming and 
insurers cannot (fully) incorporate out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reductions 
into the premium rebate. These consequences will not occur if  out-of-pocket expenditures 
and moral hazard reductions are equalized as well. 
Theoretically, there is a third (exceptional) scenario in which the average out-of-pocket 
expenditures and moral hazard reductions are the same for all risk groups distinguished in 
the risk equalization system. In this situation, which might occur just by chance, there is no 
difference between equalizing and not equalizing out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard 
reductions.
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2.4 Implications of  self  selection
Hence, the paper is concerned with the consequences of  self  selection. Self  selection occurs 
because within each premium-risk group healthy insured have a greater incentive to opt for a 
deductible than unhealthy insured. Many studies have found evidence of  self  selection within 
the health insurance market (e.g., Browne, 1992; Gardiol et al., 2006; Beck, 2004). In this 
section the consequences of  self  selection are discussed for situations with risk equalization 
and without risk equalization.
2.4.1 Without risk equalization
The premium rebate in return for a voluntary deductible in unregulated health insurance 
markets consists of  four components (Bakker et al., 2000). A first component is the insured’s 
out-of-pocket expenditures. Since the insured pays expenditures up to the deductible amount 
himself  the insurer has to reimburse less compared to full coverage. 
A second component is the moral hazard reduction. Many studies have found evidence of  
a positive correlation between insurance coverage and medical consumption controlling for 
health status. The RAND-experiment showed that those with a catastrophic insurance plan, 
i.e. a 95-percent coinsurance rate with a high cap on out-of-pocket expenses, had on average 
31 percent lower medical expenditures than those with a full-coverage plan (Manning et al., 
1987; Keeler et al., 1988; Newhouse, 1993). Studies based on data from Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, which controlled for methodological problems (such as adverse selection) in a 
non-experimental setting, confirmed the effects of  user charges on moral hazard. Van Vliet 
(2004) shows that a deductible of  € 800 in the Dutch private health insurance of  1996 led 
on average to 14 percent lower medical expenditures than full coverage. Gardiol et al. (2006) 
have found that deductibles of  CHF 970 (€ 580, 2006) and CHF 1,270 (€ 760, 2006) in the 
Swiss basic health insurance resulted in expenditure reductions of  about 17 percent. 
A third component is a reduction in administration costs. Some insured do not send their 
bills to the insurer before their total expenditures exceed the deductible, i.e. before they will 
get any reimbursement. Consequently, the insurer does not have to deal with these bills, 
which might reduce his administration costs. In the Swiss and Dutch basic health insurance 
this component will not be substantial since a large part of  the bills is settled between the 
provider of  care and the insurer, even if  insured have a deductible. For that reason we do not 
take into account this component in our analyses. 
A fourth component is the effect of  self  selection. If  self  selection occurs, the average 
medical expenditures of  the insured with a voluntary deductible will be lower than that 
of  those without a voluntary deductible. In an unregulated market this leads to market 
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segmentation, since the insurer is forced by competition to incorporate these expenditure 
differences into the premium structure. Consequently, differences in (ex-ante) health status 
will be reflected in the premium rebate for a voluntary deductible.
2.4.2 With risk equalization
The effect of  self  selection on the premium structure will be smaller in the presence of  risk 
equalization. If  the equalization payments do perfectly adjust for differences in health and 
risk, the premium rebate can be based only on the out-of-pocket expenditures (cost sharing) 
and moral hazard reduction.9 If  not, then the rebate can also be based on differences in health 
status, resulting in lower cross subsidies from healthy to unhealthy individuals compared to a 
situation without a deductible option. The following sections report on an empirical analysis, 
which was aimed at indicating the remaining effect of  self  selection after risk equalization in 
both Switzerland and the Netherlands.
2.5 Data
The data were taken from an administrative database of  a Swiss sickness fund and include 
medical expenditures and background information of  insured older than 26 years in 1996. 
These insured were continuously enrolled during the period 1998-2003, starting with 
n=197,120 and ending up with n=134,758. The main reasons for drop-out were leaving to 
another region or leaving the country, switching to another insurance company and deaths. 
The data distinguish between gross insurance claims, i.e. all expenditures known to the 
insurer, and the net insurance claims, i.e. the expenditures on top of  the deductible. The 
gross insurance claims are divided into 11 categories of  medical care, which are physician 
services, drugs from physicians, drugs from pharmacies, physiotherapy, laboratory analyses, 
inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospital care, health care at home, nursing home care, 
technical aids, and other. Available background information includes age, gender, region of  
residence, level of  deductible and premiums, among others. 
The analysis was based on the year 2003. In order to make the benefit package comparable 
to that in the Dutch basic health insurance, expenditures for nursing home care were not 
taken into account. Table 2.1 shows the percentage of  insured with voluntary deductible d in 
2003. Notice that the voluntary deductibles of  CHF 170, 370, 970 and 1,270 came on top of  
the mandatory deductible of  CHF 230. Accordingly, the total deductible levels in 2003 were 
CHF 230, 400, 600, 1,200 and 1,500. Row I shows the average gross claims and row II shows 
the average net claims per deductible. Row III shows the average out-of-pocket expenditures 
9 Under the assumption that the risk equalization system equalizes all three types of expenditures 
considered in Section 2.3.
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known to the insurer.10 Differences in gross claims between the insured with and without 
a voluntary deductible can be attributed to self  selection, differences in moral hazard and 
differences in unfiled claims. Unfiled claims occur when insured with a deductible do not 
send their bills to the insurance company when they expect no reimbursement.
Table 2.1 Descriptive results (currency = CHF, CHF 1 = € 0.65, 2006) 
Mandatory deductible 230 230 230 230 230
Voluntary deductible d 0 170 370 970 1,270
Total deductible x 230 400 600 1,200 1,500
N (total=134,758) 53% 23% 8% 2% 13%
Actual premium rebate  0 170 367 877 1,116
I (Recorded) gross claims 3,874 2,967 2,457 1,743 884
II Net claims 3,678 2,655 2,078 1,264 489
III Expenditures up to the total deductible x 196 312 379 479 395
2.6 Method and estimation results
The aim of  the empirical analyses was to examine the remaining effect of  self  selection after 
risk equalization. For this, the general equalization model described in Section 2.2.3 was used 
and (all of) the three types of  expenditures considered in Section 2.3 were equalized. The 
analysis consisted of  three steps. The first was to determine the three types of  expenditures 
to be equalized. The second was to calculate the insurer’s equalization payments and the third 
was to compute the premium (rebate) for a policy with voluntary deductible d. Accordingly, 
the discrepancy between the premium rebate and the sum of  average out-of-pocket 
expenditures and moral hazard reductions indicates the remaining effect of  self  selection. 
2.6.1 Step 1: Estimation of  the three types of  expenditures to be equalized
The analysis would have been less complex if  the original data provided full information 
about the three types of  expenditures to be equalized, i.e. net insurance claims, out-of-pocket 
expenditures due to d, and moral hazard reduction due to d. However, the only type of  
expenditures that could be obtained from the data directly was the net insurance claims. As 
discussed in Section 2.5, the recorded out-of-pocket expenditures were incomplete because 
of  unfiled claims. The moral hazard reduction could not be obtained from the data directly 
because (apart from unfiled claims) differences in gross expenditures between insured with 
10 In fact, the insured in our data-set had a coinsurance of 10 percent and hotel-type expenses of 
CHF 10 per day during in-patient care. In our analyses these two types of user charges are ignored.
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and without a deductible were probably also caused by self  selection. In order to deal with 
unfiled claims and the selection effect, the following procedure was used to estimate the out-
of-pocket expenditures and the moral hazard reduction:  
A) estimate an expenditure model on the group of  insured without a voluntary deductible;
B) predict expenditures of  the insured with a voluntary deductible by combining their 
characteristics with the coefficients obtained in step A;
C) calculate expected out-of-pocket expenditures using the results of  step B;
D) calculate moral hazard reduction due to deductible d as the expected expenditures for 
insured with deductible d (as obtained in step B) minus their net insurance claims (as 
registered in the original data) and minus their expected out-of-pocket expenditures (as 
obtained in step C).
The validity of  this procedure will be discussed in Section 2.6.1.5.
2.6.1.1 Expenditure model
Expenditures of  insured without a voluntary deductible were assumed to be recorded in full 
by the insurer and, therefore, in the data. This seems to be plausible since only 18 percent 
of  these insured had expenditures below the mandatory deductible of  CHF 230 and only 12 
percent had no expenditures recorded at all. Expenditures were estimated using the two-part 
model defined in equation (2.3). A logistic regression was used to estimate the first part. For 
the estimation of  the second part two basic options were considered, i.e. applying OLS to 
the logarithm of  expenditures and GLM with a log-link and several distributions. Regarding 
the analysis, the first option has the important drawback that the predictions need to be 
retransformed to monetary units (Duan et al., 1983). This is not the case with the second 
option, which has the additional advantage that a distribution can be chosen, that fits the 
data in a proper way (Manning and Mullahy, 2001). Finally, the second option was used in 
our analysis. The distribution selected reflects how the variance is related to the mean. As 
will be described below, E(Y)i and its variance were finally used to estimate the out-of-pocket 
expenditures which concentrate in the left tail of  the distribution. Testing a normal, log-
normal, Poisson and Gamma distribution revealed that Gamma does best in estimating the 
out-of-pocket expenditures in our data. The fit will be illustrated later on. 
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For both parts of  the model the explanatory variables were created out of  the following 
information: age, gender, region, and the gross expenditures in three previous years. 14 
variables were created to represent age/gender-groups, 9 variables were created to represent 
9 different regions, and 30 variables were created for the log(gross expenditures +1) in years 
t-1, t-2, and t-3 separately for the 10 categories of  medical care mentioned in Section 2.5. 
Appendix 1 shows the mean and standard deviation for both the dependent variable and for 
age, gender, and prior expenditures per level of  deductible.
2.6.1.2 Expected expenditures
The coefficients obtained were used to predict the expenditures of  those with d > 0 CHF. 
For insured with a deductible d these predicted expenditures were on average - a fraction F(d)0 
- higher than the actual expenditures recorded by the insurer. Theoretically, this discrepancy 
can be the effect of  moral hazard, unfiled claims, and unobserved differences in health 
status. In the remainder of  the analysis we assume unobserved differences in health status to 
be absent. The validity will be discussed in Section 2.6.1.5.
During the years in our data, the deductible levels did not change. So, given F(d)0 , the actual 
expenditures in years t-1, t-2 and t-3 were probably affected by differences in moral hazard 
and unfiled claims as well. This could have biased the estimation of  expected expenditures 
in year t, since prior expenditures were included in our model and most of  the insured 
with voluntary deductible d in year t had the same level of  deductible in previous years. We 
corrected for this by multiplying the actual expenditures in prior years with 1+ F(d)0 . This 
further increased the relative difference in predicted and actual expenditures in year t, because, 
obviously, expenditures in t-1, t-2 and t-3 have a positive impact on (predicted) expenditures 
in year t. As a result, the predicted expenditures for insured with deductible d were on average 
- a fraction F(d)1 - higher than the actual expenditures. Accordingly, we multiplied the actual 
expenditures in prior years (as recorded in the data) with 1+ F(d)1, and so on. This iterative 
process converged after 8 steps, i.e.: F(d)s did not change anymore (for s ≥ 8).
Under the assumption that unobservable risk factors are absent, the obtained estimate of  
E(Y)i  can be seen as the expected expenditures of  individual i in a situation without a 
voluntary deductible (where no unfiled claims and no moral hazard reduction would have 
occurred). Row IV of  table 2.2 shows the average expected expenditures per group of  insured 
with voluntary deductible d. Accordingly, the difference in average expected expenditures 
between these groups is fully attributable to self  selection.
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2.6.1.3 Out-of-pocket expenditures
As a next step we wanted to predict expenditures below the deductible. Using the estimate of  
E(Y)i and the associated coefficient of  variation (= cv = standard deviation divided by mean), 
an estimate of  the scale parameter k can be obtained via:
 2)(/1)4.2( vck 
Given the estimate of  k, the expected expenditures of  the insured with expenses below 
the deductible x can be calculated according to equation (2.5), derived by Van Vliet (1995, 
2004).11
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with Γ(.) the cumulative density function of  the gamma distribution with parameters c and 
k and with:
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In the empirical analyses we needed an estimate of  the expected out-of-pocket expenditures 
due to the voluntary part of  the deductible, given deductible x. To obtain this estimate we 
calculated, for the entire group of  insured with deductible d, the expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures due to the total deductible and the expected out-of-pocket expenditures due 
to the mandatory deductible of  CHF 230. Out-of-pocket expenditures due to the total 
deductible x were estimated by equation (2.7), derived by Van Vliet (1995, 2004). The out-of-
pocket expenditures due to the mandatory deductible were also estimated by equation (2.7), 
with x being replaced by CHF 230.
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E(OOPE)i,x  can be seen as the weighted sum of  the expected out-of-pocket expenditures if  
the total expenditures are below x  )),(/)1,(*)(( kckcYE i  , defined in equation (2.5), 
and the out-of-pocket expenditures if  the total expenditures exceed x (= x). Respectively, the 
weighting factors are Γ(c, k) and 1 - Γ(c, k), i.e. the probability that Y < x and the probability 
that Y > x.
11 While x refers to total deductible, d refers to the voluntary part of deductibles (see table 2.1, line 
2 and 3).
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Row V and VI in table 2.2 show the expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to the 
mandatory deductible of  CHF 230 and the expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to the 
total deductible x. Accordingly, the expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to voluntary 
deductible d (row VII, table 2.2) were calculated as the difference between these two.
Table 2.2 Expected total expenditures and expected out-of-pocket expenditures (currency = 
CHF, CHF 1 = € 0.65, 2006) 
Mandatory deductible 230 230 230 230 230
Voluntary deductible d 0 170 370 970 1,270
Total deductible x 230 400 600 1,200 1,500
IV Expected expenditures E(Y) 3,876 3,351 2,929 2,136 1,373
V Expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to  mandatory deductible 195 188 172 147 134
VI Expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to total deductible x 195 314 408 596 566
VII Expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to voluntary deductible d = VI – V 0 126 236 449 432
VIII Unfiled claims = VI – III -1 2 29 117 171
As an aside, an estimate of  the unfiled claims could be obtained by subtracting the actual 
recorded expenditures up to deductible x (row III, table 2.1) from the expected out-of-
pocket expenditure given deductible x (row VI, table 2.2).12
2.6.1.4 Expected moral hazard reduction
Having the actual net insurance claims and an estimate of  the out-of-pocket expenditures, the 
last type of  expenditures to be estimated was the moral hazard reduction due to deductible 
d. As argued above, we assumed E(Y)i  to be the expenditures that insured would have had 
in a situation without a voluntary deductible. Under this assumption, an estimate of  the moral 
hazard reduction due to deductible d could be easily calculated as E(Y) (row IV, table 2.2) 
minus the net insurance claims (row II, table 2.1) and minus the out-of-pocket expenditures 
due to the total deductible (row VI, table 2.2). 
12 Unfiled claims will occur only if the total expenditures do not exceed the total deductible.
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Table 2.3 Moral hazard reduction (currency = CHF, CHF 1 = € 0.65, 2006) 
Mandatory deductible 230 230 230 230 230
Voluntary deductible d 0 170 370 970 1,270
Total deductible x 230 400 600 1,200 1,500
IX Absolute moral hazard reduction = IV - II -VI 3 382 443 276 318
X Relative moral hazard reduction = IX / IV 0,1% 11,4% 15,1% 12,9% 23,2%
The relative moral hazard reduction in the group of  insured with deductible d could be 
calculated as the absolute moral hazard reduction (row IX, table 2.3) divided by E(Y) (row 
IV, table 2.2). The results are in line with the findings of  Newhouse (1993), Manning et al. 
(1987), Van Vliet (2004) and Gardiol (2006) described in Section 2.4.1. However, there is a 
remarkable result regarding the group of  insured with d = CHF 970. Since their deductible 
is higher than that of  the insured with a voluntary deductible of  CHF 370, one would expect 
to find a larger (relative) reduction in moral hazard. This inconsistency may be a result of  the 
fact that the group of  insured with voluntary deductible CHF 970 is relatively small.
2.6.1.5 Validity
The validity of  the correction for self  selection mainly depends on whether there are 
differences in health and risk that are not explained by the variables included in our model. 
The reduction in moral hazard was calculated as the expected expenditures E(Y) minus the 
net insurance claims and minus the (expected) out-of-pocket expenditures. In the presence 
of  unobserved differences in health and risk, the expected expenditures of  those with a 
(high) deductible were probably overestimated, resulting in an overestimation of  the moral 
hazard reduction. So, the estimated selection effect must be seen as a lower bound since it 
is exclusively based on observed differences in health and risk. However, the estimate of  the 
moral hazard effect is in line with other empirical literature, as shown in Section 2.6.1.4.13
The validity of  the correction for unfiled claims mainly depends on the precision of  the 
estimated out-of-pocket expenditures. To test this precision, we compared the predicted 
expenditures below x with the actual expenditures below x for the group of  insured without 
a voluntary deductible. Table 2.4 shows that for each level of  x the prediction closely agrees 
with the actual expenditures. The distribution test mentioned in Section 2.6.1.1 revealed that 
for the normal, log-normal and Poisson distribution the correspondence between the actual 
and predicted expenditures in these intervals was substantially poorer.
13 Another option to estimate the moral hazard reduction is to use existing empirical data (from the 
RAND-experiment, for instance). This would probably not have led to different outcomes since our 
current results are in line with existing literature.
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Table 2.4 Actual and predicted expenditures < CHF x for the insured without a voluntary 
deductible
Mean actual expenditures 
(std dev)
Mean predicted expenditures 
(std dev)
< CHF 230 196 (78) 195 (47)
< CHF 400 331 (141) 329 (83)
< CHF 600 482 (218) 478 (126)
< CHF 1,200 877 (463) 873 (260)
< CHF 1,500 1,048 (588) 1,045 (329)
2.6.2 Step 2: Calculation of  the equalization payments
To calculate the equalization payments the data set was assumed to represent the entire 
population. In general terms, the Swiss and Dutch equalization systems calculate the 
equalization payment R for insured i in risk group j as the average expenditures to be equalized 
in risk group j minus the overall average expenditures to be equalized. In Switzerland the 
payments are calculated ex-post, i.e. based on actual expenditures, while in the Netherlands 
they are calculated ex-ante, i.e. based on predicted expenditures. For reasons of  simplicity we 
followed the Swiss approach. However, it should be mentioned that this choice would not 
affect the conclusions of  the analysis. 
As mentioned above, all three types of  expenditures discussed in Section 2.3 were equalized. 
This implies that the equalization payment Rj was calculated as the average sum of  the net 
claims, out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reduction in risk group j minus the 
average sum of  these components in the whole population. The average per risk group was 
calculated by simple OLS, as is customary in real-life applications of  risk equalization and 
adjustment. In practice, administrators of  the Risk Equalization Fund cannot work with 
non-linear models to calculate predicted expenses, on which the equalization payments are 
based. The variables in the second column of  table 2.5 were used as dummies. 
Since the data do not contain information on PCG’s and DCG’s, proxies were constructed 
to indicate whether or not an insured would have been in a PCG or DCG. If  expenditures 
for prescribed drugs in t-1 exceeded CHF 1,700 then insured were assumed to be in a PCG 
and if  expenditures for inpatient care in t-1 exceeded CHF 7,000 insured were assumed to 
be in a DCG. These monetary thresholds were determined such that on average the same 
proportion of  insured was in a PCG and DCG as in the Netherlands in 2006. Finally, five 
dummies were created for both PCG’s and DCG’s to indicate the expenditure level. As an 
illustration, table 2.5 shows the adjusted R-squares of  the regressions for three sets of  risk 
factors.
35Risk equalization and voluntary deductibles
Table 2.5 Descriptive results of  three risk equalization models
Risk factors R-square Mean Std dev Min Max
Demographic Region, age/gender 0.08 3,148 1,644 637 7,423
Demographic + 
approximated 
PCG’s
Region, age/gender, dummies 
for prescribed drugs in t-1 0.25 3,148 2,941 676 20,805
Demographic + 
approximated 
PCG’s and DCG’s
Region, age/gender, dummies 
for prescribed drugs in t-1 and 
hospitalization in t-1
0.29 3,148 3,178 654 43,636
Notice that the current Swiss equalization model (2006) is comparable to the ‘demographic’-
model with risk factors region, age and gender. The current Dutch model (2006) is comparable 
to the ‘demographic + approximated PCG and DCG’-model with risk factors region, age 
and gender, pharmacy costs in t-1, and hospital costs in t-1. 
2.7 Results
The third step of  the analysis was to calculate the potential premium rebate per deductible 
level and to examine whether or not there remains an effect of  self  selection. Under the 
assumption that the loading fee is the same for all the insured, the potential rebate for 
voluntary deductible d equals the difference in average insurer’s costs between those with 
d>0 and those with d=0. The insurer’s costs equal the net claims minus equalization payment. 
We speak of  a potential rebate, since Swiss health insurers are restricted by law to set their 
rebates below the deductible amount. 
2.7.1 Step 3: Calculation of  the potential premium (rebate)
Table 2.6 shows the average net claims per deductible d. Substantial differences can be observed 
between the insured with d=0 and those with d>0. In a competitive health insurance market 
the insurer will be forced to incorporate these differences into the insurance premium. If  the 
potential rebate is calculated as the average insurer’s costs for insured without a voluntary 
deductible minus that of  insured with deductible d then it equals CHF 3,189 (CHF 3,678 - 
CHF 489) for d = CHF 1,270, etc.
Table 2.6 Average net claims and potential premium rebates
d=0 CHF d=170 CHF d=370 CHF d=970 CHF d=1,270 CHF
Actuarially fair 
premium (net claims) 3,678 2,655 2,078 1,264 489
Potential premium 
rebate 0 1,023 1,600 2,414 3,189
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In Section 2.4 we argued that, in actuarially fair terms, the premium rebate for a voluntary 
deductible in the Swiss and Dutch insurance schemes can consist of  three components: out-
of-pocket expenditures, moral hazard reduction and the effect of  self  selection. Comparing 
the results in table 2.6 with the estimated out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard 
reduction shown in tables 2.2 and 2.3 reveals that in the absence of  risk equalization the 
effect of  self  selection would be enormous. For instance, the premium rebate of  the highest 
deductible could be about 2,5 times the deductible amount, consisting of  a self  selection 
effect of  76%, moral hazard effect of  10%, and out of  pocket payments of  14%. Under 
community-rated premiums, as present in Switzerland and the Netherlands, this would have 
two important consequences. First, cross subsidies between the healthy and the unhealthy 
will be lower than in a situation without voluntary deductibles since expenditure differences 
due to differences in health and risk can be reflected in the premium rebate. Second, cream 
skimming might occur since insurers will never offer a rebate of  2.5 times the deductible 
amount. With a restricted premium rebate the insured choosing a deductible will be profitable 
while those not choosing a deductible will be unprofitable.
In the presence of  risk equalization the insurer receives a payment for the relatively high-risk 
enrollees and contributes a payment for the relatively low risks. Obviously, the variance of  
these payments depends on the number and quality of  risk factors included in the equalization 
model. Because of  differences in health status and risk, the payment received by the insurer is 
larger for the group of  insured without a voluntary deductible than for the group of  insured 
with a voluntary deductible, as shown in table 2.7. If  better risk factors are included then a 
larger part of  the differences in risk will be reflected in these payments.
Table 2.7 Average equalization payments per level of  voluntary deductible for three risk 
equalization models
d=0 CHF d=170 CHF d=370 CHF d=970 CHF d=1,270 CHF
- 0 0 0 0 0
Demographic 274 -102 -55 -91 -878
Demographic + approximated 
PCG’s 478 -181 -341 -616 -1,286
Demographic + approximated 
PCG’s and DCG’s 491 -188 -348 -637 -1,318
As a result of  these payments the insurer’s costs increase for insured with a voluntary 
deductible and decrease for insured without a voluntary deductible, as shown in table 2.8. If  
risk equalization takes into account age/gender, region, PCG’s and DCG’s, the insurer’s costs 
drop from CHF 3,678 to CHF 3,187 for insured with d = CHF 0 and increase from CHF 489 
to CHF 1,807 for insured with d = CHF 1,270.
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Table 2.8 Average insurer’s costs per level of  voluntary deductible for three risk equalization 
models
d=0 CHF d=170 CHF d=370 CHF d=970 CHF d=1,270 CHF
- 3,678 2,655 2,078 1,264 489
Demographic 3,404 2,757 2,133 1,355 1,367
Demographic + approximated 
PCG’s 3,200 2,836 2,419 1,880 1,775
Demographic + approximated 
PCG’s and DCG’s 3,187 2,843 2,426 1,901 1,807
Obviously, the potential rebates decrease with better risk equalization, as shown in table 
2.9.
Table 2.9 Potential premium rebate for deductible d after risk equalization
d=0 CHF d=170 CHF d=370 CHF d=970 CHF d=1,270 CHF
- 0 1,023 1,600 2,414 3,189
Demographic 0 647 1,271 2,049 2,037
Demographic + approximated 
PCG’s 0 364 781 1,320 1,425
Demographic + approximated 
PCG’s and DCG’s 0 344 761 1,286 1,380
However, comparing the previous tables with tables 2.2 and 2.3 reveals that even if  region, 
age/gender, PCG’s and DCG’s are included, the potential rebates for d = CHF 970 and 
d = CHF 1,270 are substantially higher than the sum of  the out-of-pocket expenditures 
and moral hazard reduction. For d = CHF 970 the difference equals CHF 561 (i.e. 1,286 
– (449 + 276)) and for CHF d = 1,270 it equals CHF 630 (i.e. 1,380 – (432 + 318)). This 
indicates that a substantial effect of  self  selection remains. It should be mentioned that this 
indication is just a lower bound. The reason is found in Section 2.6.1.5. In the presence of  
unobserved risk factors the reduction in moral hazard is probably overestimated, resulting in 
an underestimation of  the remaining effect of  self  selection. 
2.7.2 Including the ‘level of  voluntary deductible’ as a risk factor
Incentives for cream skimming and a loss of  cross subsidization (compared to a situation 
without voluntary deductibles) will be reduced by improvements in the equalization system. 
One way to avoid these two consequences is to include the level of  deductible as a risk 
factor in the equalization model. In that case the model will perfectly adjust for differences 
in expenditures to be equalized. Self  selection would then have no effect on the premium 
(rebate). 
38 Chapter 2
However, if  the level of  deductible is included as a risk factor then the conclusion of  Section 
2.3 becomes more relevant. When all three types of  expenditures are equalized then the 
potential rebate for voluntary deductible d will be a full reflection of  the (expected) out-
of-pocket expenditures and the moral hazard reduction due to deductible d, as shown in 
table 2.10. If  out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reduction are not equalized, they 
cannot be incorporated into the premium rebate. This implies that if  just the net insurance 
claims are equalized, the potential rebates will equal zero, as illustrated in figure 2.2. 
Table 2.10 Potential premium rebate (= VII in table 2.2 + IX in table 2.3) with d as a risk 
factor in the risk equalization model
d=0 CHF d=170 CHF d=370 CHF d=970 CHF d=1,270 CHF
Demographic + 
approximated PCG’s and 
DCG’s + d
0 508 679 725 750
2.8 Conclusion and discussion
In Switzerland and the Netherlands the option to take a voluntary deductible raises two 
important questions regarding the risk equalization system. The first is ‘What are the effects 
of  equalizing different types of  expenditures?’. In the presence of  a voluntary deductible, 
three types of  expenditures can be equalized, i.e. the net insurance claims, out-of-pocket 
expenditures, and expenditure savings due to moral hazard reduction. If  risk equalization 
explains all of  the variance in choice of  deductible, which will be the case if  the level of  
deductible is included as a risk factor in the equalization model, then equalizing just the 
net insurance claims prevents insurers from incorporating out-of-pocket expenditures and 
moral hazard reduction due to deductible d into the premium rebate for deductible d. If  
risk equalization explains some (but not all) of  the variance in choice of  deductible, which 
will probably be the case when the level of  deductible is not included as a risk factor in the 
equalization model, then equalizing just the net insurance claims will also confront insurers 
with incentives for cream skimming. We conclude that both consequences can be avoided by 
equalizing the out-of-pocket expenditures and moral hazard reduction as well.
The second question is ‘What are the consequences of  self  selection?’.  Self  selection occurs 
because within each premium-risk group healthy individuals have a stronger incentive to 
opt for a deductible than unhealthy individuals. As a result of  self  selection the average 
expenditures will be lower for insured with a high deductible than those with a low (or no) 
deductible. In a competitive market the insurer is forced to reflect these differences in the 
premium rebates for deductibles. We conclude that in the absence of  risk equalization the 
premium rebate in our data could far exceed the deductible amount due to a large selection 
effect. Risk equalization substantially reduces the potential rebates since expenditure 
differences due to differences in health risk are (partly) adjusted for via the equalization 
payments. However, we conclude that even a sophisticated equalization model, which takes 
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into account region, age and gender, PCG’s and DCG’s as risk factors, does not fully adjust 
for self  selection. This implies that in both Switzerland and the Netherlands, differences 
in health status between the insured with a voluntary and those without a deductible can 
(partly) be incorporated into the premium structure, which is in conflict with the aim of  risk 
equalization to realize cross subsidies between the healthy and the unhealthy. In order to 
increase these cross subsidies the level of  deductible could be included as a risk factor in the 
equalization model. However, this makes it even more important to equalize all three types 
of  expenditures discussed above. 
A substantial effect of  self  selection on the (potential) premium rebates leads to a reduction 
of  cross subsidies from the healthy to the unhealthy insured. In order to protect cross 
subsidization, the Swiss government has put limits on the actual rebates. Our results show 
that these limits are not the best way to achieve cross subsidization because of  an adverse 
effect. This is illustrated by the results in table 2.9, which reveals that the potential premium 
rebate (after risk equalization according to region, age/gender) for a voluntary deductible of  
CHF 1,270 equals CHF 2,037. This implies that even if  government equals the limit to the 
deductible amount, the insured with the highest deductible are on average more profitable to 
the insurer than those without a deductible. With a view to the actual rebates (table 2.1), this 
was the case in Switzerland in 2003, which is a strong incentive for cream skimming.
A way to increase cross subsidization without this adverse effect is to improve risk 
equalization. However, our results show that even if  risk equalization is based on region, 
age/gender and medical information, which is the case in the Netherlands (in 2006), it does 
not perfectly adjust for self  selection. This could be an important motive for governments 
to include the level of  deductible as a risk factor in the equalization model. If  this new risk 
factor is to be included then it is even more important that all three types of  expenditures 
are equalized. To include all these expenditures, information must be available on the out-of-
pocket expenditures and the moral hazard reduction. 
If  the level of  deductible is actually included as a risk factor, the premium rebates will be 
lower since differences in health status are then adjusted for via the equalization payments. 
While this increases cross subsidization, it also leads to a lower number of  insured opting 
for a deductible and less moral hazard reduction (Van Kleef  et al., 2006). Thus, from a cost 
control perspective it is better to have some effect of  self  selection on the premium rebate, 
resulting in a larger number of  insured taking a deductible and probably a larger moral 
hazard reduction. Thus, the choice whether or not to improve risk equalization by including 
the level of  deductible as a risk factor can be considered as a trade-off  between moral hazard 
and the level of  cross subsidization between the healthy and unhealthy insured.
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Appendix 2.1
Table 2.11 shows how the mean and standard deviation of  the outcome variable (gross 
expenditures) and explanatory variables age, gender and prior expenditures differ across the 
five levels of  deductible. For reasons of  privacy the information on prior expenditures is not 
shown for each of  the 10 categories of  medical care used in our model. For the same reason 
information on region of  residence is not included.
Table 2.11 Mean and standard deviation of  dependent variable and age, gender and prior 
expenditures per level of  deductible.
d=0 CHF
Mean 
(std dev)
d=170 CHF
Mean 
(std dev)
d=370 CHF
Mean 
(std dev)
d=970 CHF
Mean 
(std dev)
d=1,270 CHF
Mean 
(std dev)
Gross expenditures 3,874 (7,422) 2,967 (6,298) 2,457 (5,888) 1,743 (5,927) 884 (2,732)
Age 59 (16) 57 (14) 54 (14) 53 (14) 48 (11)
Gender = male 0.40 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50)
Gross expenditures t-1 3,499 (6,563) 2,726 (5,418) 2,276 (5,673) 1,494 (4,577) 783 (2,438)
Gross expenditures t-2 3,247 (5,820) 2,470 (4,657) 2,020 (4,311) 1,357 (3,605) 739 (2,014)
Gross expenditures t-3 3,011 (5,648) 2,284 (4,193) 1,856 (4,030) 1,279 (3,391) 717 (1,751)
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